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Abstract: The aim of this article will be to provide specific details of how the 
Mu‘tazilites differed and what arguments they used against the Ahl al-Ģadīth when 
they based their legal rulings from the Ģadīth. Specific reference will be given to the 
work of Ibn Qutayba’s Ta’wīl Mukhtalif al- Ģadīth, whose work comprises of a theolog-
ical treatise in defence of the Prophetic Ģadīth, which also attempts to find acceptable 
interpretations for Ģadīth that the Mu‘tazilites considered problematic. Special focus 
will be drawn to the legal Ģadīth, which the Mu‘tazilites considered unacceptable and 
therefore rejected them because they did not conform to their rationale.
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İbn Kuteybe’nin Mutezile’ye cevabı
Öz: Makale, Mu’tezile’nin Ehli Hadis’ten nasıl farklılaştığını ve hadiste ne tür bir 
metodoloji takip ettiğini ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır. Makalede özellikle hadis 
müdâfaasında önemi haiz olan ve Mutezile’nin problemli gördüğü hadislere dair kabul 
edilebilir yorumlar içeren İbn Kuteybe’nin Tevilu Muhtelifü’l-hadîs isimli kitabı bağla-
mında konu ele alınmaktadır. Makalede ayrıca Mutezile’nin akla uygun olmadığı gerek-
çesiyle kabul etmediği ahkâmla ilgili hadislerin analizine özellikle yoğunlaşılmaktadır. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Hadis, Ehli Hadis, Mutezile, Mütevatir, Haber-i Vâhid.
Introduction
The foundation of the Mu‘tazilites is the notion that God and everything in the world 
can be perceived through the intellect, which God creates in Man. This perception means 
that the knowledge that God exists with his many attributes and qualities can be known 
through the intellect.1 Contrary to the view of the Ahl al-Ģadīth, one can know God without 
the support of Scripture and even without God sending Prophets. In addition, according 
to the Mu‘tazilites reason has an overwhelming power over revelation. Since reason is the 
governing principle of the world, the contradiction between revelation and reason must be 
solved according to reason.2
According to the Mu‘tazilite, humans may obtain knowledge about God and the Uni-
verse through three methods:
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1. Sense perception
2. Transmitted report
3. Reason
With regard the transmitted report i.e. a report about the past; they are, generally speak-
ing, accepted as the most important source of religious knowledge by the Mu‘tazilite. If 
they were not acceptable as a source of knowledge, then it would be necessary to reject 
knowledge that is both derived from the Prophets and transmitted from them. Ultimately, 
the senses are the sources of knowledge about the physical world and reports are the source 
of knowledge of the past. To understand the metaphysical universe, one must have recourse 
to either rational inference or the report of the Prophet. The Mu‘tazilite considered these 
two sources as important. However, the difference between these sources, in the view of the 
Mu‘tazilite, is that sense perception and reason provide direct knowledge and transmitted 
reports only indirect knowledge because of an intermediary who stands in between the 
report and the object. The recipient acquires this knowledge through the intermediary (if 
the intermediary transmits it to him successfully) and hence the intermediary also has to be 
a reliable reporter.3 However, the different scholars of theology developed slightly different 
avenues to validate the Ģadīth, hence the Mu‘tazilite would come to understand Ģadīth 
somewhat differently than the Asharites, Maturidites and the Ahl al-Ģadīth.
If this is the foundation of the Mu‘tazilite then what is their position on Ģadīth, espe-
cially on Ģadīth which do not conform to the rational mind. It will suffice to mention here 
that the Mu‘tazilite and their opponents, the Ahl al-Ģadīth, had created their own methodol-
ogy; the Mu‘tazilite glorified reason to determine the proper interpretations of the sources of 
revelation and the Ahl al-Ģadīth sacralised the isnād as the only means to guarantee a pure 
understanding of Islam and rise above the heresies of the human mind. For the Mu‘tazilites, 
the Qur’ān and human reason were the main tools for content criticism. As the Qur’ān, 
being the literal word of God, laid down the legal and dogmatic principles, it provided the 
criteria for determining the contours of the faith and its community. The Mu‘tazilites main 
justification for the use of the Qur’ān as a criterion in their debates with the Ahl al-Ģadīth 
was a report in which the Prophet states: “When a Ģadīth comes to you from me, compare 
it to the Book of God and if it agrees with it then accept it, and if it differs with it, leave it.”4
For the Mu‘tazilites the Qur’ān and human reason were the main criteria to evaluate the 
Ģadīth of the Prophet. This is because the Qur’ān has been transmitted through Mutawātir 
reports and the Ģadīth were not; as they are also transmitted through Āģād reports. As 
Van Ess asserts that for the Mu‘tazilites‘in the field of Ģadīth the problem of authority arose 
as a problem of transmission’5and hence this will now take us further to discuss the terms 
Mutawātir and Khabar al-Wāģid and the Mu‘tazilites position on Ģadīth.
3 Richard C. Martin, Mark R. Woodward and Dwi S. Atmaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam: Muctazilism from 
Medieval school to Modern Symbol, 1977, (Oxford:Oneworld) 15
4 Sulaymān b. Aģmad al-Šabarānī, al-Mu’jam al-Kabīr, V12, (Maktaba Ibn Taymiyya) 233, Cf: Jonathan 
Brown, ‘How do we know Hadith Critics did Matn Criticism’, in Shah, ed. The Hadith: Critical Concepts in Islamic 
Studies, V.3, (Routledge 2010) 190-191 
5 Joseph Van Ess, L’autorite de la tradition prophetique dans la theologie mu’tazilite, in Makdisi, Sourdel and 
Sourdel-Thomine, eds. La notion d’autorite au Moyen Age Islam, Byzance, Occident, 1978, (Paris:Presses Universitaries 
de France) 211
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The Ģadīth of the Prophet Muģammad regarding its category of transmission falls into 
two categories:
1. Mutawātir
2. Khabar al-Wāģid
The term Mutawātir, which is used in different sciences of legal methodology, theology 
and in Ģadīth criticism conveys two distinct meanings. In legal methodology and theology 
it refers to the epistemological value and certainty of a report, but in Ģadīth criticism it 
refers to a report that is well known and widespread, but which does not necessary yield 
certain knowledge. Although some Ģadīth scholars, beginning in the 9th/15th Century, ap-
plied the term in the first sense, this usage did not become widespread.6 The term itself 
was not fully fledged especially in the time of al-Rāmahurmuzī (d.360AH/970CE) and 
during the time of al-Ģākim al-Naysābūrī (d.405AH/1014CE) as there is no mention of 
this in their works. It was from the seventh/thirteen century onwards that the term began 
to be applied on a wide scale, albeit loosely. As from the time of Ibn Ŝalāģ al-Shahrazūrī 
(d.643AH/1245CE), the concept was studied in more detail and the definition as to what 
precisely the word stood for was refined by a subdivision, in which tawātur lafžī, i.e. the 
verbatim Mutawātir transmission of a text, became distinguished from tawātur ma‘nawī, 
i.e. transmission in respect of only the gist or one salient feature of a given text. It was gen-
erally, admitted that the number of reports transmitted ma‘nawiyyan vastly outnumbered 
those transmitted lafžiyyan.7 Āmidī (d.630AH/1233CE) argues that the tawātur originated 
as an epistemological concept in theology during the 2nd/8th century and was applied to ju-
risprudence already in that and the following century. Furthermore, this concept in Ģadīth 
criticism was used in late medieval works, which led to some problems and confusion.8 It 
may be argued here that the early Ģadīth experts did not use these two terms because most 
if not all the Ģadīth that have a proper chain of transmission are āģād reports and for this 
reason the early Ģadīth experts did not use these two classifications.
The term Mutawātir is a report which yields necessary knowledge. For example, if re-
ports are established as a reliable source of knowledge, the truthfulness of a prophet’s mes-
sage follows by necessity, because the truthfulness of a prophet’s mission is established by 
concomitant miracles. However, the certainty of the knowledge provided by miracles is valid 
only for those of the Prophet’s contemporaries who witnessed them directly. This knowl-
edge was subsequently transmitted through reports that termed either khabar Mutawātir 
or khabar āģād. Mutawātir reports provide necessary knowledge and they must be be-
lieved.9 As an example, according to Muslim theologians, the authenticity of the Qur’ān is 
established through Mutawātir reports and thus no one can deny this fact. Abū al-Husayn 
al-Baŝrī (d.436AH/1044CE) argues that according to some scholars, knowledge obtained 
through Mutawātir reports is acquired (muktasab), because in order to understand whether 
something is Mutawātir or not, one must begin from some premise, and this premise causes 
such a person not to consider it as immediate knowledge, since the certainty of the Qur’ān, 
6 Huseyin Hansu, ‘Notes on the term Mutawātir and its reception in Hadith Criticism’, Islamic Law and Society 16, 
(2009) 383-384
7 Juynboll, ‘(Re) Appraisal of some technical terms in Hadith sciences’, Islamic Law & Society, 8:3 (2001), 303-49
8 cAli b. Abu cAli Al-Amidi, Al-Iģkām fi Uŝūl al-Aģkām, 2005, (Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-cIlmiyya) 258
9 Ibid.
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Sunna and Ijmā‘ are established, hence, these scholars say that knowledge derived from these 
sources is also acquired knowledge.10
With regards to the term khabar, it is a report that bears the possibility of being either 
true or false, because the possibility of falsehood exists.11 Theologians treat reports as a 
primary source of knowledge about revelation and the Prophet because they are the only 
means by which one can obtain knowledge of situations that are outside one’s individual 
experience. Knowledge or awareness of the past is possible only through reports. Therefore, 
reports are considered the most important source of knowledge in all religious communi-
ties.12 As mentioned earlier, these reports were transmitted through either khabar Mutawātir 
reports or khabar āģād reports. They are āģād because they do not fulfil the conditions 
of Mutawātir, hence these reports fall short of providing certain knowledge and, having a 
merely probable character, they cannot be the basis of conviction.13
The Mu‘tazilite’s position regarding Mutawātir and Āģād
Āmidī (d.630AH/1233CE) states that the majority of the jurists and theologians agree 
that the knowledge acquired from a Mutawātir report is of incontrovertible certainty. With 
regards to Āģād then there is a dispute amongst the theologians. Āmidī states that a group 
of theologians agree that knowledge is acquired from this report. However, the dispute is 
whether this knowledge is of certainty or speculation. The Ahl al-Ģadīth, the Žāhirite and 
Aģmad b. Ģanbal (d.241AH/855CE), according to one of his narrations, maintain that Āģād 
reports do prove the knowledge of certainty.14 With regards to Mutawātir, Abū al-Husayn 
al-Baŝrī (d.436AH/1044CE) argues that it is speculative. However, the position of ‘Abd al-
Jabbār (d.415AH/1025CE) in general regarding the Sunna as a whole is that the Sunna is 
the Prophet’s order, which must be carried out perpetually, or it is his act, which must be 
followed continuously. The definition relates to the statement or acts of the Prophet, which 
is proved or established from him. Now, a tradition which is based on the authority of a 
single transmitter (Khabar al-Wāģid) or single transmitters (Āģād) and which fulfils all the 
criteria and conditions of trustworthiness is called Sunna according to ordinary usage.15 ‘Abd 
al-Jabbār opposes the consideration of these traditions as the true Sunna because ‘we are not 
safe from being liars concerning this’. He argues that such traditions do not convey certainty, 
therefore it is forbidden from the point of view of reason to say definitely: ‘The Prophet has 
said it’.16 Ultimately, for ‘Abd al-Jabbār the majority of traditions are of uncertain source, 
due to rational considerations. In evidence, to support his position and attitude towards 
traditions, he cites mainly statements of Shu‘ba b. al-Ģajjāj (d.160AH/776CE), whom he 
names ‘Commander of the faithful concerning the tradition’ which espouse the danger of 
10 Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, Al-Muctamad fi Uŝūl al-fiqh, 2010, V.2, (Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-cIlmiyya) 80
11 Huseyin Hansu, ‘Notes on the term Mutawātir and its reception in Hadith Criticism’, Islamic Law and Society 
16, (2009) 387
12 Ibid: 384
13 Ibid. Cf: Usman Ghani, The concept of Sunna in Mu’tazilite thought, in Duderija, ed. The Sunna and its Status 
in Islamic Law: The search for a sound Ģadīth, 2015, (Palgrave Macmillan) 59-74
14 cAli b. Abu cAli al-Amidi, Al-Iģkām fi Uŝūl al-Aģkām, 2005, (Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-cIlmiyya) 258
15 Benyamin Abrahamov, Islamic Theology: Traditionalism and Rationalism, 1998, (Edinburgh University 
Press) 45
16 Ibid:45
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dealing with traditions and the notion that a great many are not genuine. He further, argues 
that if there were no proof of the obligation to carry out such acts according to this type of 
traditions, there would be no benefit in transmitting them. For according to the Prophet, 
the criterion for judging the authenticity of traditions is their agreement with the contents 
of the Qur’ān and the Sunna, which are known. This criterion is relevant to deal with tradi-
tions which deal with practice, but there is no obligation to accept Khabar al-Wāģid, which 
deals with theological issues. He goes further onto censuring the Ahl al-Ģadīth not because 
of the essence of the tradition, but rather because of their wrong method and their limited 
understanding. To summarise, ‘Abd al-Jabbār does not oppose Khabar al-Wāģid by virtue 
of itself, but because many traditions of this kind are spurious because their transmitters 
cannot be relied upon due to their negligence and lack of understanding, therefore, they 
also have an impact on matters and issues related to Islamic Law.17
Ibn Qutayba’s Ta’wīl Mukhtalif al-Ģadīth
This is a treatise written in response to a letter directed to Ibn Qutayba according to 
whom the Mu‘tazilite particularly accused the Ahl al-Ģadīth of lying and expressing con-
tradictory statements so that divisions arose and the Muslim community each claimed the 
truth on the basis of Ģadīth. He describes how the Mu‘tazilites mock the Ahl al-Ģadīth for 
heaping accolades on one another for their knowledge of different narrations of Ģadīth 
without understanding the basic meaning or even the grammar. His work comprises a 
theological treatise in defence of the Ģadīth alongside attempting to find acceptable inter-
pretations for Ģadīth that the Mu‘tazilites consider problematic.18 In his Ta’wīl, Ibn Qutayba 
find himself rebutting four general criticisms of Ģadīth by the Mu‘tazilites:
1. A Ģadīth contradicts the Qur’ān
2. It contradicts other established Ģadīth
3. It is contradicted by rational investigation (al-nažar), which usually involves the 
Ģadīth having some unacceptable legal or dogmatic implications
4. It is contradicted by rational proof (ģujjat al-‘aql), which generally means it clashes 
with some notion of what is acceptable or possible according to the precepts of 
reason or the basic tenets of the Muslim rationalist worldview.19
As an example, there are traditions which oppose speculation and rational arguments, 
such as the Prophet’s statement that he is more entitled to be sceptical than Ibrāhīm concern-
ing God’s actions. The assumption which lies at the basis of the argument is Muģammad’s 
perfection, which could not be impaired by doubts. Furthermore, some traditions do not 
coincide with human being’s experience. According to a tradition, the Prophet said that no 
human being would remain on earth in the year 100AH. Now the Mu‘tazilite argue and 
maintain that we are in 300AH and the world is more populated than before.20
17 Ibid: 45
18 Jonathan Brown, ‘How do we know Hadith Critics did Matn Criticism’, in Shah, ed. The Hadith: Critical 
Concepts in Islamic Studies, V.3 (Routledge 2010) 190-191 
19 Gerard Lecomte, Le Traite des divergences du Hadit d’Ibn Qutayba, 1962 (Institute Francais De Demas) 25-26 
20 cAbd Allah b. Muslim b. Qutayba, Ta’wil Mukhtalif al-Hadith, 2006, (Beirut, Al-Maktaba al-Islami) 211 
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In similar vein, a Ģadīth put forward by the Mu‘tazilite which they argue as “whose 
beginning,” according to them, “is spoiled by its end” (yufsidu awwalahu akhiruhu), in other 
words, the Ģadīth is allegedly incoherent and has severe legal implications. The Ģadīth in 
question states that the Prophet said:
“If one of you awakes from sleep, then he should not plunge his hand into the water-
container until he washes it three times (ģattā yaghsilahā thalāthan)-after all, he doesn’t 
know where his hand has spent the night.” 21
The Mu‘tazilite claim that the last phrase (he doesn’t know where his hand has spent 
the night) is:
a) Patently absurd, since everyone knows where their hand has been during the night
b) Legally inapposite, since even if one touches one’s genitalia while awake, that does 
not vitiate one’s previous ablutions
c) Inconsistent with a general precept of the law that involuntary acts (e.g., those com-
mitted while sleeping) have no adverse legal consequences for the person who com-
mits them.
However, in response, Ibn Qutayba disputes point b and in the course of that discus-
sion, he says the following: ‘So if the ablutions for touching the genitalia are that one wash 
the hands, then it is clear that God’s Messenger commanded the person waking up from 
sleep to wash his hand before he puts it into the water- container, because that person does 
not know where his hand has spent during the night. Perhaps, he says, during his sleep he 
touched his genitalia or his anus with it, and it cannot be certain that a drop of urine or 
the remnants of semen did not get on his hand if he had sexual intercourse before falling 
asleep. So if he put it into the water-container before washing it, he would defile the water 
and spoil it. He singled out the sleeping person for this because the sleeping person’s hand 
might fall on these places without him being aware of it’.22
Another example is the Ģadīth in which the Prophet Muģammad insists that his wives 
conceal themselves completely from a blind male visitor. When his wives complain that 
the man is blind, Muģammad replies that the issue is that his wives should not look at the 
man. The Mu‘tazilite allege that the Qur’ān and consensus (ijmā‘) invalidate the Ģadīth. 
Consensus, they argue, allows that women may lawfully look at men so long as the women 
are appropriately covered. What is more, the Qur’ān chapter 24:31 provides that women 
need not cover those of their charms (zinā) which in the ordinary course are open to view 
(žahara). Ibn Qutayba responds that Muģammad’s wives were implicitly ordered to conceal 
themselves from all male visitors in the Qur’ān chapter 33:53 which mentions this point. The 
rule in the Ģadīth applies, then, to Muģammad’s wives in particular: This verse is specific for 
the wives of God’s Messenger in particular, just as they were singled out in regard to it being 
unlawful for any Muslim to marry them. Ibn Qutayba goes on to say, however, that the rule 
applies mostly in their dwellings, not when they must perform public religious obligations 
such as the pilgrimage, or have other pressing reasons to go out in public.23
21 Ibid:262
22 Ibid:262
23 Ibid
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Another example where the Ģadīth contradict each other is the example where the 
Ģadīth states that water cannot be defiled by anything and the other that water in an 
amount greater than or equal to two pitchers full (idhā balagha...qullatayn) cannot be de-
filed. The Mu‘tazilites say that the negative implication of the second Ģadīth (small amounts 
of water can be defiled) contradicts the general import of the first (no matter how small 
the amount, water cannot be defiled by anything). Ibn Qutayba replies to his opponents 
that the first Ģadīth refers to water in the sense of large amounts of water, which usage, in 
turn, is the more usual. He further argues that the second Ģadīth does not contradict the 
first one. Rather, God’s Messenger merely said that water cannot be defiled by anything in 
the most usual case and for the most part, since what is most usual for wells and pools is 
that they have a large amount of water. Accordingly, he uttered the phrase in a way that 
was of restricted import (fa akhraja al-kalām makhraj al-khuŝūŝ). This is just like when 
one says, “Nothing can repel the flood-stream” and, in the same vein, “A wall couldn’t hold 
the flood-stream back.” One intends thereby, a large amount of it, not a little. It is also like 
saying, “Nothing can withstand fire.” One does not intend thereby the flame in a lantern, 
which can be extinguished by blowing, and not sparks either. Rather, one intends the fire 
in a conflagration. Then, after saying that in the first Ģadīth, in the second Ģadīth he used 
the term “two pitchers full” to distinguish the amount of water that is subject to defilement 
from a large amount of water that cannot be defiled by anything.24
Another example where the Ģadīth are in conflict with the Qur’ān is regarding Adul-
tery. The Mu‘tazilite claim that a Ģadīth in which Muģammad announces his intention 
to impose the punishments of stoning and exile ‘on the basis of God’s Book’ contradicts 
the Qur’ān, which contains no mention of stoning or exile. Ibn Qutayba offers an ad hoc 
argument to the effect that ‘God’s Book in this instance refers not to the Qur’ān, but rather 
to God’s ruling (ģukm) or imposition of an obligation (farē). As evidence, he cites some 
further verses of the Qur’ān that allegedly use cognates from the root kataba in this way, 
and a verse of poetry, as proof of his claim. The Ģadīth in question is well known and was 
the subject of much discussion in early legal texts. Shāfi‘ī offers a very complex analysis of 
this same problem in the al-Risāla, mostly under the rubric of abrogation.25 Subsequently, 
the Mu‘tazilite also allegedly argue that the Ģadīth in which Muģammad stoned an adul-
terer conflicts with the verse in chapter 4 verse 25, which provides that the punishment for 
adultery is flogging. The dispute centres around, at least in part, on what the word muģŝanāt 
means in the verse in question. The opponents claim that it must mean female slaves (Imā). 
Ibn Qutayba argues that it means ‘free virgin women’ and cites the beginning of the same 
verse, in which as he argues, uses muģŝanāt in that sense. Ibn Qutayba also expressly labels 
his interpretation a Ta’wīl.26
There are further traditions from the Prophet reported by Abū Hurayra, which con-
tradict other reports from other companions. I will put them in each category and discuss 
the implications.
24 Ibid
25 Muģammad b. Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī, Al-Risāla, 2003 (Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-cIlmiyya) 123
26 cAbd Allah b. Muslim b. Qutayba, Ta’wil Mukhtalif al-Hadith, 2006 (Beirut, Al-Maktaba al-Islami) 262
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An example of a Ģadīth which contradicts other established Ģadīth:
Abū Hurayra reports that the Prophet said: ‘When the shoe lace of any one of you is 
broken, he should not walk in the second one until he has got it repaired.’27
The Ģadīth which contradicts this report is narrated from ‘Āisha that sometimes the 
Prophet’s shoelace would break and he would walk with one shoe until he would fix the 
other.28
The Mu‘tazilite maintain that latter report contradicts the former. Ibn Qutayba argues 
that there is no contradiction in the reports because when a person’s shoelace breaks or 
snaps then he can either hold on to it and walk in one shoe until he finds another lace or he 
can take one step at a time until he rectifies his other shoe.29 However, this is an explana-
tion from Ibn Qutayba and his attempt here is not to reject either report but he has tried to 
harmonise and reconcile the two reports.
Another example where Ģadīth was contradicted by rational investigation (al-nažar), 
which usually involves the Ģadīth having some unacceptable legal or dogmatic implications, 
is the Prophet’s statement that he is more entitled to be sceptical than Ibrāhīm concern-
ing God’s actions. The assumption which lies at the basis of the argument is Muģammad’s 
perfection, which could not be impaired by doubts. The opponents also contended that this 
is also disparagement of Ibrahim’s personality as a prophet. Ibn Qutayba argues that this 
was the humility and humbleness of the Prophet Muģammad and there is no sign of him 
undermining the personality of Ibrāhīm.30
More specifically, Ibrāhīm al-Nažžām (d.221AH/836CE) has criticised Abū Hurayra for 
narrating and accuses him of fabricating Ģadīth. The first Ģadīth narrated by Abū Hurayra 
in Bukhārī that the Prophet Muģammad said:
‘None of you should walk, wearing one shoe only; he should either put on both shoes or put 
on no shoes whatsoever.’31
Nažžām’s argument is that when ‘Āisha heard this report she said: ‘I will definitely op-
pose Abū Hurayra.’ Ibn Qutayba does not provide a strong argument here in defence of 
Abū Hurayra besides arguing that he stayed with the Prophet for more than three years and 
narrated more from him than other companions. He also concedes however, that ‘Umar and 
‘Āisha did criticize him for his narrations.32
The second Ģadīth which is criticized by ‘Āisha in which Abū Hurayra reports from the 
Prophet Muģammad who said:
‘A woman, an ass and a dog disrupt the prayer, but something like the back of a saddle 
guards against that.’33
27 Muslim b. Ģajjāj, Ŝaģīģ Muslim, 1998 (1st Edition, Darussalam, Riyadh) 938 
28 Muģammad b. ‘Isā al-Tirmidhī, Jāmi‘,1999 (1st Edition, Darussalam , Riyadh) 421
29 cAbd Allah b. Muslim b. Qutayba, Ta’wil Mukhtalif al-Hadith, 2006, (Beirut, Al-Maktaba al-Islami) 192-194
30 Ibid:207
31 Muģammad b. Ismācīl al-Bukhārī, Al-Jāmic al-Ŝaģīģ, 1999, (2nd Edition, Darussalam, Riyadh) 1031
32 cAbd Allah b. Muslim b. Qutayba, Ta’wil Mukhtalif al-Hadith, 2006, (Beirut, Al-Maktaba al-Islami) 114
33 Muslim b. Ģajjāj, Ŝaģīģ Muslim, 1998, (1st Edition, Darussalam, Riyadh) 209
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Nažžām’s argument is that ‘Āisha reported: ‘The Prophet used to pray at night while I lay 
between him and the Qibla.’34
Ibn Qutayba’s argument is very succinct as mentioned before and he does not attempt 
to rebut this further argument of the opponents. However, from the opponent’s perspective 
there are another five reports from ‘Āisha which contradict Abū Hurayra’s report. They are 
as ‘Āisha reports:
The Messenger of Allah said his whole prayer (Tahajjud prayer) during the night while I 
lay between him and the Qibla. When he intended to say Witr (prayer) he awakened me and 
I too said witr (prayer).35  ‘Urwa b. Zubayr reported: ‘Āisha asked: What disrupts the prayer? 
We said: The woman and the ass. Upon this she remarked: Is the woman an ugly animal? 
I lay in front of the Messenger of Allah like the bier of a corpse and he performed prayer. 36
1. Masrūq reported that it was mentioned before ‘Āisha that prayer is invalidated (in 
case of passing) of a dog, an ass and a woman (before the worshipper, when he is not 
screened). Upon this ‘Āisha said: You likened us to the asses and the dogs. By Allah I 
saw the Messenger of Allah saying prayer while I lay on the bedstead between him 
and the Qibla. When I felt the need, I did not like to move to the front (of the Prophet) 
and perturb the Messenger of Allah and quietly moved out from under its legs.37
2. Aswad reported that ‘Āisha said: You have made us equal to the dogs and the asses, 
whereas I lay on the bedstead and the Messenger of Allah came there and stood in 
the middle of the bedstead and said prayer. I did not like to take off the quilt from 
me (in that state), so I moved away quietly from the front legs of the bedstead and 
thus came out of the quilt.38
3. ‘Āisha reported: I was sleeping in front of the Messenger of Allah with my legs be-
tween him and the Qibla. When he prostrated he nipped me and I drew up my legs, 
and when he stood up, I stretched them out. She said: At that time there were no 
lamps in the houses.39
The legal and ritual implications of these contradictory reports are found in Tirmidhī’s 
(d.279AH/892CE) Jāmi‘, where he has reported both traditions; one which does not nul-
lify the prayer and the other which does nullify it. Tirmidhī states that the majority of the 
Companions and the Successors held the view that nothing nullifies the prayer and that a 
minority held the view that an ass, woman and a black dog nullify the prayer. He further 
mentions the stance of Aģmad (d.241AH/855CE) regarding this issue as saying, ‘I do not 
doubt that the black dog nullifies the prayer but with regards the ass and the woman I am 
doubtful.’ To reinforce Aģmad’s view, Tirmidhī states Isģāq b. Rāhwayh’s (d.238AH/853CE) 
stance which is that nothing nullifies the prayer except the black dog.40
34 Ibid:938 
35 Ibid
36 Ibid:209
37 Ibid
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid
40 Muģammad b. ‘Isā al-Tirmidhī, Jāmi‘,1999, (1st Edition, Darussalam , Riyadh) 92
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The next argument of Nažžām against Abū Hurayra is when ‘Alī was informed that Abū 
Hurayra initiates from the right hand when he dresses or performs ablution, ‘Alī asked for 
water and started to wash with the left hand and said: ‘I will definitely oppose Abū Hurayra’.41
Again Ibn Qutayba does not respond and challenge this argument but Hilālī in his foot-
note commentary of this statement argues that this is falsely attributed to ‘Alī because this is 
a matter which is agreed upon by the Companions and successors to start from the right.42
The final argument of Nažžām is the Ģadīth which states, ‘whoever wakes up in the 
morning in the state of major ritual impurity, then there is no fasting for him.43
The whole incident is recorded from Abū Bakr b. ‘Abd al-Raģmān who said, ‘I heard Abū 
Hurayra mentioning one of his statements ‘whoever wakes up in the morning in the state 
of major defilement, then there is no fasting for him.’ I mentioned this to ‘Abd al-Raģmān 
b. al-Ģārith, who then mentioned this to his father, who then denied this report. So ‘Abd al- 
Raģmān and I went to ‘Āisha and Umm Salama, and asked ‘Āisha about this statement and 
she replied, ‘The Prophet would wake up in the morning in the state of major defilement and 
he would still be in the state of fasting’. After hearing this from ‘Āisha, we went to Marwān 
b. al-Ģakam and mentioned the whole incident. Marwān then advised us to approach Abū 
Hurayra and see how he responded. So we approached Abū Hurayra and stated that which 
‘Āisha and Umm Salama had said. Abū Hurayra responded by saying, ‘did both of them say 
that (‘Āisha and Umm Salama)? ‘Yes’, ‘Abd al-Raģmān replied. Abū Hurayra then said, ‘They 
are most knowledgeable’. Then Abū Hurayra attributed his statement to another companion, 
Faēl b. ‘Abbās. He said, ‘I heard this statement from Faēl and not directly from the Prophet.’ 44
Nažžām states after mentioning this report that Abū Hurayra used a deceased man as 
evidence and people had thought that he had heard the Ģadīth from the Prophet but he 
had not.45
The ritual and legal implications of this report is that it conflicts with the report of 
‘Āisha and Umm Salama, which is the base of Nažžām’s argument. Their report states that 
the Prophet would be in a state of major impurity at the time of Fajr prayer but then he 
would have a bath and continue fasting. Tirmidhī states that this Ģadīth is an authentic 
sound report and majority of the people of knowledge from the Companions and others 
act upon this. However, he further mentions that some successors had the opinion that if 
anyone is in state of major impurity then he will have to make up for the fast on another 
day. He then states that the first statement is the most correct.46 Nawawī (d.676AH/1278CE) 
however, claims that there is consensus amongst the scholars on this issue and that the fast 
will not be nullified. With regards to the position of Abū Hurayra, it is mentioned that he 
retracted from his old opinion and accepted the new verdict as is evident in the report in 
Ŝaģīģ Muslim.47 In addition, also it can also be established that the reports of Abū Hurayra 
41 cAbd Allah b. Muslim b. Qutayba, Ta’wil Mukhtalif al-Hadith, 2006, (Beirut, Al-Maktaba al-Islami) 95
42 Ibid
43 Muslim b. Ģajjāj, Ŝaģīģ Muslim, 1998, (1st Edition, Darussalam, Riyadh) 452
44 Ibid
45 cAbd Allah b. Muslim b. Qutayba, Ta’wil Mukhtalif al-Hadith, 2006, (Beirut, Al-Maktaba al-Islami) 95
46 Muģammad b. ‘Isā al-Tirmidhī, Jāmi‘,1999, (1st Edition, Darussalam , Riyadh) 196
47 Muģammad cAbd al-Raģmān al-Mubārakfūrī, Tuģfat al-Aģwadhī sharģ Jāmic al-Tirmidhī, 2001,(Beirut, Dar 
al-Kutub al-cIlmiyya) 412
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do have implications in Islamic law because if these reports are used to establish anything 
theological and jurisprudential issues then Nažžām’s argument here is that Abū Hurayra’s 
reports are unreliable because of their conflicting nature.
Having gone through the aforementioned examples through the work of Ibn Qutay-
ba, the Ģadīth, which are considered by the Ahl al-Ģadīth to be an important source of 
knowledge that equals the Qur’ān, and on which the Ahl al-Ģadīth rely, is according to 
the Mu‘tazilites, a device which cannot be relied on, because reason and man’s experience 
contradict its teachings, its nature is self-contradictory, and it is refuted by both the Qur’ān 
and consensus. Ibn Qutayba provides a defence in his Ta’wīl on these traditions that conflict 
with the principles of the Mu‘tazilites.
Mu‘tazilite and legal matters
Consequently, the Mu‘tazilite position against the Ahl al-Ģadīth was weakened at the 
end of the Baghdad Inquisition in 234AH/848CE. It was only during the classical pe-
riod of Mu‘tazilism spanning from the late third/ninth century to the early fifth/eleventh 
century that the school had to increasingly compromise with its opponents.48 It was dur-
ing this period the Mu‘tazilites began a serious study of Ģadīth comparable to those of 
their transmission-based adversaries. As an example, Muģammad b. ‘Imrān al-Marzubānī 
(d.384AH/994CE) was a Mu‘tazilite and Ģadīth scholars considered him reliable as a 
transmitter; hence, he composed a book on the Ģadīth of the Mu‘tazila.49 Al-Dhahabī 
(d.748AH/1348CE)in his Tadhkirat al-Huffāž has also mentioned Abū Sa‘īd Ismā‘īl b. ‘Alī 
al-Sammān (d.434AH/1042CE) of Rayy as al-Khašīb al-Baghdādī’s teacher in Ģadīth who 
was theologically a Mu‘tazilite and jurisprudentially a follower of the Ģanafī school of law.50
With regards to legal matters, the Basran and Baghdad schools of the Mu’tazilites 
dropped their requirements for authenticating legal Ģadīth to two narrators at each link in 
the chain of narration (isnād). Abū ‘Alī al-Jubbāī (d.303AH/915AH) explicitly demanded 
doubling transmission for Āģād Ģadīth to be admitted in legal matters.51 Abū al-Qāsim al-
Balkhī (d.319AH/913CE) compromised similarly. In his Qubūl al-Akhbār, he still demanded 
massively transmitted Ģadīth (Mutawātir) for theological doctrine and general legal indica-
tions. For deriving laws, he believed that one need only provide a report transmitted by two 
or three people or two or three upright people at each level of the chain of narration. He 
equates this with the requirements for testimony in court.52
‘Abd al-Jabbār (d.415AH/1025CE) career represents a major shift in the Mu‘tazilite 
School with regards to the position of āģād Ģadīth in Mu‘tazilite thought and their concept 
of Sunna. While previously Mu‘tazilites had generally associated warily with the Ģadīth 
Ģanafī School of law, ‘Abd al-Jabbār retained his loyalty to the School of al-Shāfi‘ī after 
embracing Mu‘tazilite doctrine. As an adherent to the school of al-Shāfi‘ī he was obliged to 
48 Josep Van Ess, The Flowering of Muslim Theology,2006, (Harvard University Press) 169-171 
49 Al-Khatib al-Baghdadi, Tarikh Baghdad, 2011(Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-cIlmiyya) 353 
50 Muhammad b. Ahmad Al-Dhahabi, Tadhkirat al-Huffaz, 1998, (Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-cIlmiyya) 213 
51 Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, Al-Muctamad fi Uŝūl al-fiqh, 2010, V.2, (Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-cIlmiyya) 80
52 Abu al-Qasim al-Kacbi al-Balkhi, Qubūl al-Akhbār wa macrifat al-Rijāl, No Publishing date, V.1, (Beirut, Dar 
al-Kutub al-cIlmiyya) 11
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accept rulings from āģād Ģadīth in matters of law even if they lacked the multiple narra-
tions that earlier Mu‘tazilites such as al-Balkhī and al-Jubbāī had required. In the theology 
of the Mu‘tazilites, in his Uŝūl al-Khamsa, ‘Abd al-Jabbār thus states that while discussing 
issues of dogma and theology requires massively transmitted reports, deriving law demands 
only one or two narrations.53
By the second half of the fourth century AH/tenth century CE, the Mu‘tazilites standard 
for authenticating Ģadīth admissible in discussions of law thus generally demanded dou-
bling transmission. Al-Ģāzimī (d.594AH/1179CE) in his shurūš al-a’imma al-Khamsa states 
that the Mu‘tazila, were, in fact, the only group to require a certain number of transmitters 
for the acceptance of āģād Ģadīth. As mentioned earlier, Al-Balkhī had stated, they based 
this on the requirements for court testimony.54
One of the later Mu‘tazilite Abū al-Ģusayn al-Baŝrī (d.436AH/1044CE) like his teacher 
predecessor and teacher ‘Abd al-Jabbār espoused Mu‘tazilite theology while belonging to 
the Shāfi‘ī School of law. His work on legal theory, Kitāb al-Mu‘tamad fī uŝūl al-Fiqh, would 
become one of the most influential works in that genre and provide a framework for many 
later Shāfi‘ī uŝūl books.55 Abū al-Ģusayn’s position on the epistemological yield of āģād 
Ģadīth reflected the Shāfi‘ī position, which was embraced as the orthodox position among 
almost all Sunnis i.e. that such Ģadīth yield only probable knowledge (žann), but are none-
theless legally compelling (mūjib al-amal).56 He further argues that the consensus of the 
umma, however, alters this completely. He explains that, ‘as for the āģād Ģadīth, when the 
umma has come to consensus as to what it entails and deemed it authentic, then its authen-
ticity is epistemologically certain.57
Conclusion
To conclude, the Ģadīth, which is considered by the Ahl al-Ģadīth to be an important 
source of knowledge that equals the Qur’ān, and on which the Ahl al-Ģadīth rely, is ac-
cording to the Mu‘tazilite, a device which cannot be relied on, because reason and man’s 
experience contradict its teachings, its nature is self-contradictory, and it is refuted by both 
the Qur’ān and consensus. Ibn Qutayba provides a defence in his Ta’wīl on these traditions 
which conflict with the principles of the Mu‘tazilites. As these Ģadīth did not meet their 
criteria of acceptance and were also considered irrational, which is the main principle of 
the Mu‘tazilite, they rejected them. Moreover, we have seen the reports of Abū Hurayra 
which have a similar nature of contradicting other reports hence, this is why his reports 
were targeted especially by Nažžām and hence this idea of rationalism and traditionalism 
promoted different groups within the Islamic community, which have a different outlook 
on the Ģadīth tradition. It is difficult to argue that the Mu‘tazilites as a school of thought 
53 Richard C. Martin, Mark R. Woodward and Dwi S. Atmaja, Defenders of Reason in Islam: Muctazilism from 
Medieval school to Modern Symbol, 1977, (Oxford: Oneworld)108
54 Abū Bakr Muģammad b. Mūsā al-Ģāzimī, Shurūš al-a’immat al-khamsa, 1984, (Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-
cIlmiyya) 61
55 Jonathan Brown, The Canonization of Al-Bukhari & Muslim: The Formation and Function of the Sunni 
Hadith Canon, 2007(Brill)178
56 Abu al-Husayn al-Basri, Al-Muctamad fi Uŝūl al-fiqh, 2010, V.2, (Beirut, Dar al-Kutub al-cIlmiyya) 570 
57 Ibid:550
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were in complete agreement on the principles regarding the Sunna and especially the terms 
Mutawātir and Āģād. Furthermore, some specific Ģadīth may have been re-interpreted if 
found not in par with rationalism as this was the main criteria for the Mu‘tazilites. Neverthe-
less, in legal issues the Ģadīth seems to have been understood in par with the majority of 
scholars, especially since most of the Mu‘tazilites followed Sunni schools of jurisprudence.
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